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“Living Together” or Living
Apart from Religious Freedoms?
The European Court of Human
Right’s Concept of “Living
Together” and Its Impact on
Religious Freedom
Shelby L. Wade
In the 2014 monumental court decision S.A.S. v. France,
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the French law
banning both burqas and niqabs in public spaces was justified.
The Court based this justification on the concept of “living
together,” stating this newly-created concept allowed limitations
on certain rights, such as the freedom of religion. With this
decision, the Court vacated precedent which used a balancing
test to weigh exceptions, such as national security in very
narrow situations, against the limitations on individual
freedoms. The new “living together” test is extremely farfetched, vague, and controversial. This Note discusses the past
precedential balancing test the Court followed prior to the
decision in S.A.S., and why it is favored against the new “living
together” justification. This Note also examines the potential
disastrous impacts on personal freedoms the new test may
cause, particularly in reference to new face-covering garment
cases which may appear before the European Court of Human
Rights.



J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2016, to thunderous applause during her re-election
campaign for Chancellor, Angela Merkel called for a ban on Muslim
full-face veils in Germany.1 Merkel declared that the veils are
“contrary to integration,” and “not acceptable in our country.”2
Merkel also described the importance of showing faces in
communication between persons, which is “essential to our living
together.” 3
Merkel’s claims and potential policies seem contrary to
international human rights law, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights’ Article 9, which guarantees “the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.”4 Merkel’s words, however, reflect a
recent trend in European countries of instituting bans on Muslim
face-coverings, such as the niqab and the burqa.5

1.

Lizzie Dearden, Angela Merkel calls for burqa ban ‘wherever legally
possible’ in Germany, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 2016, 12:00 GMT),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-burqaburka-ban-veils-angela-merkel-cdu-muslims-speech-refugee-crisiselections-term-vote-a7458536.html [https://perma.cc/G9T7-2JVB].

2.

Id.

3.

Tara John, Angela Merkel, Seeking Re-Election, Calls for Burqa Ban,
TIME (Dec. 6, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://time.com/4591678/angelamerkel-burqa-ban-cdu-cinference/ [https://perma.cc/C627-UDDD].

4.

Id.

5.

Id.
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Headscarves and face-coverings play a significant role in both
religious identity and self-expression for many members of the Muslim
community. The niqab covers the entire body, head, and face with an
opening left for the eyes.6 In contrast, the burqa is a full-body veil,
which covers the wearer’s entire face and body with a mesh screen
over the eyes.7 There are numerous styles of Islamic dress which
reflect local traditions and different interpretations of Islamic law.8
Some women do not wear anything that distinguishes them as
Muslim, while others choose to wear the niqab and completely veil
their bodies.
The niqab and burqa are banned in numerous European
countries, including France, Bulgaria, and Belgium.9 Other European
countries have introduced bans to their respective legislative bodies.10
Critics of the bans argue these types of laws not only breed
Islamophobia, but also violate many aspects of fundamental freedoms,
such as the freedom of religion and freedom of expression, granted by
the European Convention on Human Rights.11 The classic
justifications for the full-face veil bans often rely on security purposes,
stating that the ban prevents anyone from being able to hide their
identity in public.12 Other classic justifications revolve around
promoting freedom and rights for women, for instance, French
politicians who claim the bans protect the “gender equality” and
“dignity” of women.13
6.

A Brief History of the Veil in Islam, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES,
https://www.facinghistory.org/civic-dilemmas/brief-history-veil-islam
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/696V-HC9H].

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Siobhan Fenton, Bulgaria Imposes Burqa Ban – and Will Cut Benefits
of Women Who Defy It, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 1 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bulgaria-burka-banbenefits-cut-burkini-niqab-a7340601.html
[https://perma.cc/9CBPGK52].

10.

The Islamic veil across Europe, BBC (Jan.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095
European Veil Laws] [https://perma.cc/5VXR-5QXL].

11.

Ben McPartland, Burqa ban five years on- ‘We created a monster’, THE
LOCAL (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.thelocal.fr/20151012/france-burqaban-five-years-on-we-create-a-monster [https://perma.cc/8MZ2-95XK];
see also European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9-10, Nov. 4,
1950, F-67075 Strasbourg cedex, www.echr.coe.int (lays out the specific
rights of freedom of religion and expression that must be protected for
all persons).

12.

Id.

13.

Angelique Chrisafis, France’s burqa ban: women are ‘effectively under
house
arrest’,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
19,
2011),
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However, one of the most controversial, and potentially most
influential justifications for the Muslim full-face veil bans did not
come from politicians or officials of a country instituting a ban, but
rather the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court” or
“ECtHR”).14 In the 2014 European Court of Human Rights case
S.A.S. v. France, the Court held that a France veil ban was justified
based on “respect for the minimum requirements of life in society” or
of “living together.”15 According to the Court, wearing a veil
compromised the aspect of “living together” in a unified society as the
face plays a role in social interaction.16 The newly-introduced concept
of “living together” has been the subject of much criticism and
debate, with even the dissenting judges in S.A.S. stating the
proposition was “far fetched” and “vague.”17
The Court recognized the idea of “living together” as a legitimate
justification for limitations on rights guaranteed by the European
Court of Human Rights.18 In some situations, “living together” should
take precedence, including situations where national security could
potentially be at stake, such as at a security check point.19 The
national security justification is widely accepted, but applies only in
narrow circumstances. More controversial and problematic is the
extended reach of the “living together” justification sanctioned by the
Court in S.A.S. With this ruling, the Court has expanded the breadth
of full-face veil bans to any public place. This Note suggests that by
broadening the scope of where religious garment bans can be
implemented, the Court is setting a dangerous precedent where
“living together” and assimilation are valued more than one’s
freedom. This would be an unpredictable move that would have
detrimental, long-lasting consequences in the realm of religious
freedom. An unexplained, vague justification allows for countries to
more frequently limit its citizens’ individual rights with
underwhelming reasons. As a result, instead of offering a strong,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/19/battle-for-the-burqa
[https://perma.cc/NLJ2-7FXQ].
14.

See S.A.S. v. France, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 (dissent claims that there
is no legitimate aim for the ban and the balance between protected
rights and sacrificed rights is not correct).

15.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ ¶ 116, 121.

16.

Maxim Ferschtman & Jonathan Birchall, Case Watch: ECHR Says
“Living Together” Justifies Ban on Full-Face Veils, OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS (July 1, 2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
voices/case-watch-echr-says-living-together-justifies-ban-full-face-veils
[https://perma.cc/9DSL-QK23].

17.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at dissenting opinion ¶ 5.

18.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ ¶ 121-22.

19.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 139.
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recognized justification such as national security, countries can
institute bans for much simpler reasons - such as simply having a
small barrier like a cloth over one’s face - to take precedence over
one’s freedom of religion.
In Part II, this Note will provide a background of current
instituted and proposed European religious face-covering bans. Part
III will discuss current human rights law, the specific Convention
articles which grant the right of religious expression, and how these
articles may be overlooked in a “living together” justification. Part IV
of this note will discuss the precedential cases regarding religious
expression, specifically religious clothing, as well as the quintessential
case which introduced the concept of “living together”, S.A.S. v.
France. Part V will discuss cases regarding full-face veils which are
currently before the European Court of Human Rights. Part VI
addresses the potential future effect the concept of “living together”
may have on the cases before the Court. Finally, Part VII addresses
the disastrous and troublesome future “living together” has
introduced for the Court, unless changes, such as a re-introduction of
a balancing test, are implemented.

II. CURRENT INSTITUTED AND PROPOSED
EUROPEAN RELIGIOUS FACE-COVERING BANS.
Religious face-covering bans are not a new concept in Europe with
Bulgaria, Belgium, and France all having country-wide bans.20 Other
countries have either proposed bans that will be instituted in the near
future, or have instituted bans that were struck down by their
domestic courts.21
In April 2011, a French law, No. 2010-1192, was instituted,
banning the burqa and the niqab from being worn in public.22 The law
passed by a vote of 246 to 1 with about 100 abstentions.23 The goal of
the law was to “prohibit the act of aiming to conceal the face in
public.”24 The French law inflicts a fine of 150 euros, in addition to or
instead of a citizenship course.25 If one forces a woman to wear a
niqab or a burqa, the resulting punishment is a year in prison or a
20.

Fenton, supra note 9.

21.

European Veil Laws, supra note 10.

22.

Susan S. M. Edwards, No Burqas We’re French! The Wide Margin of
Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling, 26 DENNING L. J. 246, 248
(2014).

23.

French Senate approves burqa ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/
[https://perma.cc/4P5R-CZ2Z] [hereinafter French Senate].

24.

Edwards, supra note 22, at 248.

25.

French Senate, supra note 23.
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15,000 euro fine.26 Per data collected in 2015, 1,546 fines have been
imposed under the French law.27
Following France, in July 2011, Belgium instituted its own ban of
the full Islamic veil in public.28 Offenders of Belgium’s law are
punished with a 15 to 25 euro fine and a possibility of up to seven
days in jail.29 In December 2012, the Belgian Constitutional Court
upheld the ban.30 The court stated the ban did not violate
fundamental rights because the ban did not cover places of worship.31
Also, the court, while acknowledging that the ban interfered with the
rights of the applicants who challenged the ban, accepted that the
aims of the Belgium government were legitimate.32 These aims
included public security and “living together” in society.33
Bulgaria also enacted a veil ban in 2016. However, under
Bulgaria’s ban, women not only face fines of up to 770 euros, but also
a suspension of social security benefits.34
In November 2016, the Dutch parliament approved plans for a
partial burqa ban in places such as government buildings, schools,
hospitals, and on public transportation.35 The ban would not apply to
those wearing face-coverings on the street, but only for security
reasons, or “in specific situations where it is essential for people to be

26.

Id.

27.

European Veil Laws, supra note 10.

28.

Belgian ban on full face veils comes into force, BBC (July 23, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14261921
[https://perma.cc/L9J9-R4KU].

29.

Belgium’s lower house votes to ban burqa, CNN (April 30, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/29/belgium.burqa.ban/
[https://perma.cc/4R86-AQ8L].

30.

Saïla Ouald Chaib, Belgian Constitutional Court says Ban on Facecoverings does not violate Human Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Dec.
14,
2012),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/12/14/belgianconstitutional-court-ban-on-face-coverings-does-not-violate-humanrights/ [https://perma.cc/6G6N-T457].

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Fenton, supra note 9.

35.

Harriet Agerholm, Dutch parliament approves partial burqa ban in
(Nov.
29,
2016),
public
places,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-burqa-veilban-holland-votes-for-partial-restrictions-some-public-placesa7445656.html [https://perma.cc/UU8R-HZLY].
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seen.”36 The ban would also outlaw all face-coverings, which would
include both ski-masks and helmets.37
Spain attempted to institute a nationwide ban on burqas in public
places in 2010, but Spain’s Parliament rejected the proposal.38 In
2013, the Spanish Supreme Court overturned a municipal ordinance
banning the wearing of burqas as unconstitutional as it violated “the
fundamental right to the exercise of the freedom of religion, which is
guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution.”39
In January 2017, Austria became the latest country to make a
move toward a full-face veil ban.40 Austria’s Social Democratic and
Austrian People’s parties outlined their view of Austria as an “open
society that requires open communication.” In their view, “[f]ull-face
veils in public places are the opposite of that and will be banned.”41
The Austrian government wants to present the state in a “religiously
neutral manner” and accordingly, banned all civil servants from
wearing Islamic headscarves.42
Public polls conducted in other European countries show a public
backing of burqa and niqab bans.43 A poll conducted in Britain in
August 2016 showed that 57 percent were in favor of a ban, and just
25 percent disagreed with the idea of a veil ban.44 A poll conducted in
Germany also in August 2016 found that 81 percent of Germans
36.

Agence France-Presse, Dutch cabinet approves partial ban on Islamic
(May
22,
2015),
veil
in
public
areas,
THE GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/22/netherlands-islamicveil-niqab-ban-proposal-dutch-cabinet [https://perma.cc/8FEG-MQGA].

37.

Agerholm, supra note 35.

38.

Alan Clendenning & Harold Heckle, Spain parliament rejects burqa banfor now, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/38332675/ns/world_news-europe/t/spain-parliament-rejects-burqaban-now/ [https://perma.cc/9C7V-9MVN].

39.

Soeren Kern, Spain: Supreme Court Overturns Burqa Ban, GATESTONE
INSTITUTE (March 4, 2013), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/
3610/spain-burqa-ban [https://perma.cc/5L8H-XT3K].

40.

Laura Goehler & Angela Dewan, Austrian government moves to ban
full-face veil, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/
01/31/europe/austria-face-veil-ban/ [https://perma.cc/ZL3M-83KT.].

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

James Blitz, Poll Shows Support in Europe for Burqa Ban, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/e0c0e732254d-11df-9cdb-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/7HG5-2PH2].

44.

Jon Stone, British public overwhelmingly support banning the Islamic
(Aug.
31,
2016),
burqa
by
two
to
one,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/islam-muslim-veilburka-ban-burkini-poll-uk-britain-france-a7218386.html
[https://perma.cc/P63Y-XB76].
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approved of either a ban on the burqa.45 Of this 81 percent, 51
percent of Germans wanted to see a total ban on the burqa, while
only 30 percent approved of a partial ban on the burqa.46

III. QUINESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
LIMITATIONS.
Several of the core international human rights instruments
contain protections against discrimination based on religion and allow
the fundamental freedom of expression.47 Many of the countries who
have either instituted or proposed full-face veil bans are signatories of
the European Convention on Human Rights, and have ratified the
Convention.48 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not
a legally binding document, it has heavily influenced the constitutions
of many European nations.49 As such, European reverence of these
important human rights instruments appears sanctimonious in light of
the fact that the face-covering bans being enacted across Europe
directly contradict many of their core tenants.
The European Convention on Human Rights prohibits
“discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or
association with a national minority, among other status.”50 The
Convention also states that “the High Contracting Parties shall secure
to everyone in their jurisdiction freedoms” such as “the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” relayed in Article 9 of
the Convention.51 Also secured are the right “to manifest one’s

45.

Josh Lowe, Germans Back Burqa Ban, Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26,
2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/burqa-ban-germany-germans-pollburkini-angela-merkel-493775 [https://perma.cc/39M9-6PC8].

46.

Id.

47.

Emily Howie, Protecting the Human Right to Freedom of Expression in
International Law, 20:1 INT’L J. OF SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 12
(2018).

48.

Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL OF EUROPE
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/fulllist//conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=eIfdVOaw;%20https:/
/www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights
[https://perma.cc/C5KN-LTJ9].

49.

Nancy Flowers, A Short History of Human Rights, UNIV. OF MINNESOTA
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part1/short-history.html [https://perma.cc/GJ5M-492M] (last visited Feb.
20, 2017).

50.

European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights].

51.

Id.
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religion in worship, teaching, practice, and observation” and “the
right to freedom of expression” which is contained in Article 10.
The Human Rights Committee has specifically emphasized “that
any specific regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public may
involve a violation of a number of rights guaranteed by the [ICCPR]
such as: article 26, on non-discrimination;… articles 18 and 19, when
women are subjected to clothing requirements that are not in keeping
with their religion or other right of self-expression; and, lastly, article
27, when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which
the woman can lay a claim.”52
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone
is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
without distinction of any kind” such as race, color, sex, religion,
etc.53
Some noteworthy Articles of the Declaration include Article 7,
which states “all are equal before the law and are entitled without
discrimination to equal protection under the law.”54 It also states that
“[a]ll are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.”55 Article 8 states “[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the tribunals for acts violating their fundamental
rights granted by the constitution or law.”56 Article 18 declares that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship, and observance.”57 Lastly, Article 19 of the
Declaration states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression.”58
Most of the countries which have instituted or attempted to
institute full-face veil bans have ratified both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on
Human Rights. Most challenges to the full-face veil bans cite these
fundamental human rights instruments.

52.

Human Rights Watch, Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality:
Headscarf Bans for Teachers and Civil Servants in Germany,
www.hrw.org, [https://perma.cc/RUX4-EU3W] (Feb. 26, 2009).

53.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) at art. 2. [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.
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These main international human rights instruments show that
individual freedoms are often innate and should not be disturbed.59
However, these treaties permit limitations of these freedoms in certain
situations. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights,
states that the freedoms are subject to “limitations as are prescribed
by law and necessary in a democratic society.”60 In addition, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also allows limitations which
“are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others.”61 The
limitations must also meet “the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”62
None of these limitations equate to “living together.” The most
similar limitation, in which “living together” could potentially fall, is
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which allows a
limitation for “the general welfare in a democratic society.”63
However, general welfare generally refers to the ability of a
government to provide basic necessities for its citizens, not to ensure a
group of citizens removes a cloth covering from their face so
socializing with others has no possible barrier.64 A government has no
plausible way to ensure every single person in a country is
comfortable at all times. By disallowing the burqa or niqab, a
government may be making one group feel comfortable in socializing,
while making those who regularly wear burqas or niqabs
uncomfortable.
In order to ensure there is not an abuse of these granted human
rights, a balancing of interests can, and should occur. There are
certain situations where national interests may override the granting
of individual freedoms. However, this should be a very narrowed and
specified category granted in rare, compelling circumstances. The
approach the Court is taking - granting a ban with no narrow focus or
intent - is an abuse of its discretion and of innate human rights.
59.

See Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy, STANFORD PHILOSOPHICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 1, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kantsocial-political/ [https://perma.cc/GDN6-L5W9] (“Kant held that every
rational being had both an innate right to freedom and a duty to enter
into a civil condition governed by a social contract in order to realize
and preserve that freedom.”).

60.

Convention on Human Rights, supra note 50, at art. 9.

61.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 53, at art. 29.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

See Definition of General Welfare, THE FREE DICTIONARY, (Mar. 18,
2018), https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/General+Welfare
[https://perma.cc/7GQR-BXL2] (defining the general welfare as
government concern for the health, peace, and morality of its citizens).
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IV. PRECEDENTIAL CASES REGARDING RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION AND THE VACATION OF PRECEDENT
IN S.A.S. V. FRANCE.
Numerous cases regarding the display of religious symbols have
been brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
particularly cases involving face and head coverings. Many cases
invoke the fundamental freedoms of religion and expression granted
by founding human rights instruments; however, many have failed to
ensure freedom in wearing religious garments. There has been victory
for religious freedom where the head-covering ban in question is not
narrowly-tailored to a specific place, e.g. in a public.65 In these cases,
the ban is often found too broad and is overruled.66 The decisions in
these cases before the ECtHR often hinge on the specific location
where the covering is being worn.67 Two such cases, Phull v France
and El Morsli v France, involve religious coverings worn during
security checks.68 The ECtHR heard both of these cases prior to
France’s veil ban.
Phull v. France was brought before a Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights in 2005.69 Phull was a practicing Sikh and
was required to wear a turban. Phull complained that, when going
through the security scanner at an airport, he was required to remove
his turban.70 This was required even after Phull agreed to go through
a walk-through scanner and to be checked with a hand-held detector.
Phull claimed an infringement of his right to freedom under Article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court; however,
stated that safety checks are necessary to the public safety and was
within the purview of Article 9.71 Thus, the Court stated that the

65.

Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010).

66.

See id. (finding that the burqa ban was not narrowly defined).

67.

See id. (analyzing where the ban takes effect).

68.

Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet, Religious Symbols and Clothing (Dec. 2017),
available
at:
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Religious_Symbols_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WBK5-JDCB] [hereinafter Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet].

69.

Hilary Khoury, S.A.S. v. France: The Full-Face Veil as a Threat to
Public Safety and the Protection of Others, 23 TULANE J. OF INT’L. AND
COMP. LAW 607, 612 (2015).

70.

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF
MARGINALISED INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES IN NATIONAL CONTEXT 88
(Dia Anagnostou & Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, eds., 2010).

71.

Khoury, supra note 69, at 612.
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implementation of such bans in relation to safety checks was within
the state’s reach to ensure public safety.72
Similarly, El Morsli v. France, involved an Islamic woman who
refused to remove her veil for purposes of an identity check at a
Consulate.73 The applicant also complained of a violation of her right
to freedom of religion, specifically Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.74 The European Court of Human
Rights saw no reason for departing from the rationale in Phull
regarding security checks.
While both Phull and El Morsli focused specifically on the
removal of religious garb for security purposes, broader reaching cases
have also been brought before the ECtHR concerning the wearing of
religious symbols or clothing in a public place. The first major case is
Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey. The applicants in Ahmet Arslan
are members of a religious group who were arrested for breaking two
Turkish laws- one against wearing headgear and the other against
wearing religious clothing in public, unless it is for religious
ceremonies.75 The religious group required a turban, baggy pants, and
a tunic to be worn, and the members to carry a stick.76 The applicants
claimed that their conviction under the Turkish laws violated Article
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.77 In the case,
Turkey cited prevention of “acts of provocation, proselytism, and
propaganda” to justify these regulations, but had no solid evidence of
abuse.78 Furthermore, Turkey also claimed the broad restrictions were
“necessary in a democratic society.”79
The European Court of Human Rights found that the Turkish
courts and laws did violate the applicants’ freedom of religion by
limiting their expression of religion through their clothing.80 The
72.

Id.

73.

El Morsli v. France, App. No. 15585/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).

74.

El Morsli, App. No. 15585/06 Eur. Ct. H.R..

75.

Conviction of Group for Wearing Religious Clothing Overturned by
European Court of Human Rights, HARVARD INTL. L. J. (March 3,
2010),
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/03/conviction-of-group-forwearing-religious-clothing-overturned-by-european-court-of-humanrights/
[https://perma.cc/XR5U-X2F3]
[hereinafter
Conviction
Overturned].

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Sally Pei, Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination
Jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights, 122 YALE L. J.
1089, 1095 (2013).

79.

Id.

80.

Id.
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European Court of Human Rights stated “that it might have accepted
that strict maintenance of a secular system was important for
Turkey’s democracy and public safety, but that Turkish judicial
decisions at issue had failed to rely on that justification.”81
Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the applicants “were
punished for their religious dress in public areas open to all, versus
public establishments where the state’s interest in religious neutrality
might outweigh an individuals’ right to manifest his or her religion.”82
Thus, the Court held that the ban applied too widely, contrasting to
more the limited restrictions in Phull or El Morsli.83
All of these previous cases involved challenges to either bans of
certain religious wear or to being asked to remove a head covering.
These cases in particular, Ahmet, have led to the reasoning behind
one of the most influential cases regarding religious expression: S.A.S
v. France. The decision in S.A.S. set forth the roadmap for future
challenges to religious head-covering bans. S.A.S. v. France was the
first individual complaint, regarding a nationwide full-face veil ban, to
reach the European Court of Human Rights.84
S.A.S. v. France involved a 24-year-old French citizen who
brought a case at the European Court of Human Rights against
France’s full-face veil law, no. 2010-1192.85 S.A.S, a practicing Sunni
Muslim, was born in Pakistan, where it is customarily viewed as
respectful for women to wear a full-veil in public. She did not wear a
niqab in public at all times, but wished to be able to wear it when she
chose to do so.86 S.A.S. did not claim to want to keep her niqab on at
all times, nor was she pressured by her husband or any members of
her family to wear her veil.87 S.A.S. also stated she would agree to
show her face when requested for any necessary security checks.88
S.A.S. claimed that the French law, which makes it illegal for
anyone to cover their face in a public place, violated several articles in
the European Convention on Human Rights,89 namely her right:
against inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), to respect for
81.

Conviction Overturned, supra note 75.

82.

Conviction Overturned, supra note 75.

83.

Conviction Overturned, supra note 75.

84.

Ilias Trispiotis, Two Interpretations of ‘Living Together’ in European
Human Rights Law, 75 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 580, (2016).

85.

Sune Lægaard, Burqa Ban, Freedom of Religion and ‘Living Together’,
16 HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 203 (Sept. 2015).

86.

Trispiotis, supra note 45.

87.

Id. at 586.

88.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at ¶ 13.

89.

Lægaard, supra note 85, at 203.
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private life (Article 8), to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
(Article 9), to freedom of expression (Article 10), and to freedom of
association (Article 11), taken separately and together with Article 14
of the Convention, which is the prohibition of discrimination.90
The French government cited both public safety and “ensuring
‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic
society” as justification for the ban91 In the second aim, the French
referred to three values - human dignity, gender equality, and the
concept of “living together.”92 For the last concept, France argued
that the ban was justified on the basis that “the voluntary and
systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite
simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of living
together in French society.”93 The Court summarized France’s
arguments as stating that “the face plays a significant role in human
interaction: more so than any other part of the body, the face
expresses the existence of the individual as a unique person…[t]he
effect of concealing one’s face in public places is to break the social
tie.”94
The Court accepted that the ban raised an issue regarding the
manifestation of one’s religion or beliefs, and accepted that the ban
constituted a form of interference with the applicant’s rights;
however, the ban was still surprisingly upheld.95
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that public safety was a
legitimate aim, as was the concept of “living together.”96 However,
even though the Court acknowledged that a total ban in all public
places was disproportionate in order to fulfill the public safety ground,
the concept of living together still justified the total ban as
proportionate.97 The Court upheld the ban because it was justified
under French law based on the legitimate aim of “respect for the
minimum requirements of life in society.”98 The Court stated that the
“veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as

90.

Id. at 204.

91.

Jill Marshall, S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or
Empowerment of Identities, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REVIEW 377, 381
(April 2015).

92.

Id.

93.

Lægaard, supra note 85, at 204.

94.

Eva Brems, SAS v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L. J. 58,
67 (2016).

95.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at ¶ 110.

96.

Marshall, supra note 91, at 378.

97.

Id. at 382.

98.

S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 121.
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breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialization which
makes living together easier.”99
According to the Court, wearing a veil undermined the term
“living together” as the face plays a significant role in social
interaction.100 Thus, the concealment of the face is perceived as
problematic because it breaches “the right of others to live in a space
of socialization which makes living together easier.”101 A concealed
face through the systematic wearing of a burqa or niqab, per the
Court, “falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is
necessary for social interaction.”102 The Court reasoned that the fullface veil ban was instituted to protect social interaction, essential to
“pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.”103 The Court viewed
“living together” as a necessary social need, a need so important that
it outweighed the right to wear a full-face veil in public.104 In
balancing the interests at stake, the Court also cited the fact that
women could still wear non-face-covering clothing, such as
headscarves, and that the 150 Euro fine was small.105
The murky justification behind the concept of “living together”
did not persuade the dissenting judges, who called it “far fetched” and
“vague.”106 Furthermore, the dissenting judges did not find that the
majority had shown which precise rights of others could be inferred
from this concept of “living together.”107 The dissenters acknowledged
that the face is important to communication, but did not “lead to the
conclusion that human interaction is impossible if the full face is not
shown.” 108 In turn, they also expressed “that the individual rights

99.

Id.

100. See Marshall, supra note 91, at 384 (discussing the holding of the
European Court in S.A.S., in which it sided with the French
government and its view of the importance of the face in social
interaction).
101. Id. at 384-85.
102. Id. at 385.
103. Trispiotis, supra note 84, at 588.
104. See S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at ¶ 153-54 (“the respondent State is
seeking to protect a principle of interaction between individuals, which
in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also
of tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic
society.”).
105. See id (discussing the sanctions attached to the ban).
106. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at dissenting opinion ¶ 5.
107. Marshall, supra note 91, at 385.
108. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at dissenting opinion ¶ 9.
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fostered by the Convention should not give way to ‘abstract
principles’ such as living together.”109
Opponents of the ruling state that the “living together” holding
given by the Court makes a “mockery of freedom of expression,
religious or otherwise.”110 John Dalhuisen, the Europe and Central
Asia Programme Director at Amnesty International, stated that with
its ruling, the Court has declared that “discomfort and shock are the
price democratic societies must pay precisely to enable ‘living
together’.”111 The reality is that in forcing people to ‘live together’,
this ruling will end up forcing a small minority to live apart, as it
effectively obliges women to choose between expressing their religious
beliefs and being in public.”112

V. WHAT EFFECT WILL “LIVING TOGETHER”
HAVE ON POST- S.A.S. CASES?
Following the 2014 controversial ruling in S.A.S. v. France, two
other cases have recently been filed and are pending application
before the Belgian government. These two cases, which have been
ruled on, could potentially appear before the European Court of
Human Rights on appeal.
The first case, Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium involves two
applicants fined for wearing a face-covering. One is a female Belgian
national who was fined in Brussels in 2009 for violation of a municipal
face-covering ban.113 She successfully challenged her fine before a
police tribunal; however, due to the nationwide Belgian criminal ban,
the applicant stated she stopped wearing the face veil because of the
fear of being stopped by Belgian police, the stigmatization
surrounding the law, and the possibility of fines.114
109. Alexandria Weller, The Future of “Living Together”: An Analysis of the
European Court of Human Right’s S.A.S. v. France, 41 N.C. J. INTL. L.
FORUM 105, 127 (2016).
110. Marshall, supra note 91, at 378.
111. European Court ruling on full-face veils punishes women for expressing
their
beliefs,
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
(July
1,
2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/european-courtruling-full-face-veils-punishes-women-expressing-their-religion/
[https://perma.cc/P8H3-N2WZ] [hereinafter European Court Ruling].
112. Id.
113. See Eva Brems, Face veils in Strasbourg (bis): the Belgian cases,
STRASBOURG
OBSERVERS
(Dec.
28,
2015),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/12/28/face-veils-in-strasbourgbis-the-belgian-cases/ [https://perma.cc/GS9D-E5NC] (discussing the
case of Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium).
114. See id. (explaining the views of the applicant Belkacemi in which she
stopped wearing the face veil).
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The second applicant in Belkacemi is a Moroccan national who
lives in Belgium and was fined in Brussels in 2011.115 After the
Belgian nationwide ban was adopted, the applicant refused to go out
in public without her face veil, and instead stays at home. This
decision due to fear of the ban has affected both her private and social
life.116
The applicants in Belkacemi filed a claim for the suspension and
annulment of the burqa ban before the Belgian Constitutional Court
on July 27, 2001.117 The applicants invoked articles of the European
Convention on Human Rights in support of their claims, particularly
the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8) the freedom
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9), and the prohibition of
discrimination (Article 14).118 On October 5, 2011, the Belgian
Constitutional Court refused to suspend the effect of the challenged
burqa act, as the applicants did not demonstrate that the application
of the act during the proceedings caused serious irrevocable
prejudice.119 Following this decision, subsequent actions were
introduced by another Muslim woman, two non-Muslim people, and
non-profit organizations.120
The Constitutional Court then ruled on the actions for annulment
of the burqa ban on December 6, 2012, holding that the Act “met the
condition of foreseeability required by the Constitution and the
European Convention on Human Rights.”121 The Court also held that
the rights to freedom of expression, religion, and to private life are
not absolute and limitations are allowed if found to be necessary in a
democratic society.122 Furthermore, while the Court found the burqa

115. See id. (discussing the second applicant in Belkacemi and Oussar v.
Belgium).
116. See id. (discussing the fears of the second applicant Oussar).
117. See Eva Brems, THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS IN EUROPE
AND THE LAW 168 (Eva Brems, ed., 2014) (discussing the previous claim
of Belkacemi and Oussar before the Belgian Court).
118. Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet, supra note 68.
119. See EMMANUELLE BRIBOSIA & ISABELLE RORIVE, REPORT ON MEASURES
TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION 32 (European Network of Legal Experts in
the Non-discrimination Field, 2013), http://www.refworld.org/
pdfid/540da8064.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY32-6E9W] (discussing the
judgment of the Constitutional Court in the case brought by parties
Belkacemi and Oussar).
120. See id. (discussing the subsequent actions “for annulment of the ‘Antiburqa’ Act” taken by others following the Belkacemi and Oussar case).
121. Id.
122. See id. (discussing the holding of the Constitutional Court in the
Belkacemi and Oussar case).
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ban interfered with religious freedom, the aims of the act were
legitimate and proportionate.123
Another important case questioning the Belgian burqa ban is
Dakir v. Belgium. Dakir involves a Belgian woman and her complaint
regarding both municipal and Belgium’s nationwide face-veil bans.
Dakir was communicated to the Belgium on July 9, 2015.124The
applicant invoked articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights in support of her claims, particularly the right to respect for
private and family life (Article 8) the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion (Article 9), and the freedom of expression (Article 10)
both in isolation and in combination with the prohibition of
discrimination (Article 14).125 The Human Rights Centre at Ghent
University filed a third party intervention in Dakir.126 In their
intervention, the Centre explored the differences between the French
cases, such as S.A.S. v. France, and the Belgian cases.127
The first major difference between the French and Belgian ban is
that both the municipal and nationwide bans include fines, whether
administrative or criminal fines.128 The second difference is that that
Belgian ban, unlike the French ban, does not contain a provision that
penalizes another person who forces another to cover her face.129 The
last major difference between the French and Belgian bans is the
process which led to the actual adoption of the bans. In France, the
ban is looked at by a collection of expert opinions, and there is an
inclusion of advice both on the legality of the ban and it’s conformity
with human rights.130 France also includes discussion with both
chambers of parliament.131 Belgian’s process of instituting the ban is
much simpler and less engaged than the French process.
While there is no record of a specific ruling on the Dakir case
because the application is still pending, per precedential rulings by

123. Id. at 32-33.
124. Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet, supra note 68 (discussing Dakir v. Belgium).
125. See id. (discussing Dakir’s claims under the European Court of Human
Rights).
126. Brems, supra note 113.
127. Written submission by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University as
Third-Party Interveners, Fouzia Dakir v. Belgium, (Application No.
4619/12).
128. Brems, supra note 94, at 71 {distinguishing between the French and
Belgian face covering cases).
129. Id.
130. See Brems, supra note 113 (discussing the differences between the
Belgian and French face covering bans).
131. Id.
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the Belgian Constitutional Court, such as in Belkacemi and Oussar v.
Belgium, the Belgian burqa ban will most likely be upheld.

VI. THE POTENTIAL AFFECT A JUSTIFICATION OF
“LIVING TOGETHER” COULD HAVE ON FUTURE
FACE-COVERING CASES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
While S.A.S. v. France cannot be appealed as it was handed
down by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber, future cases before the Court
could still be affected by the S.A.S holding.132
As the dissenting judges noted in S.A.S., the Court’s concept of
“living together” is extremely vague and general.133 The Court did not
take the extra step to clarify what actually constitutes “the rights and
freedoms of others” which are outside the scope of rights protected by
the Convention.134 With cases concerning similar full-face veil bans,
the decisions may provide the Court with an opportunity to specify
and narrow the meaning of “living together.”
Furthermore, as countries have seen with the ruling in S.A.S., the
concept of “living together” may be used as an effective justification
for future bans that extend far beyond just face-coverings. As a result,
there may be more cases concerning bans on other forms of religious
expression seen by the Court where the government cites the “living
together” justification. Also, as previously-mentioned, polls conducted
in other European countries, such as Britain and Germany, show a
shifting public opinion of approval of bans regarding full-face veils.
This potential influx of cases may provide the Court with various
opportunities to hopefully clarify what “living together” entails.
In the event Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium and Dakir v.
Belgium are brought before the Court, the concept of “living
together” will most certainly be invoked as the basis for the respective
Belgian ban. As the S.A.S. holding shows, other justifications, such as
maintaining public safety and preventing gender discrimination, have
been unpersuasive in the past and may be forgone entirely. Thus,
more countries, such as Belgium, may capitalize on the justification of
“living together” in defense of their bans, particularly for any appeals
or cases brought before the Court.135

132. European Court Ruling, supra note 111 (discussing the European
Convention of Human Rights Judgment in S.A.S. v. France).
133. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at dissenting opinion ¶ 5.
134. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at dissenting opinion ¶ 5.
135. Weller, supra note 109, at 134 (noting the activities of other nations in
the wake of the ruling in S.A.S. v. France and the trend that may
follow).
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The introduction of “living together” in the S.A.S. is not
completely random in light of France’s proud legacy as a secular
nation or what is more commonly referred to as “laïcité.”136 Laïcité
refers the freedom of citizens and public institutions from the
influence of organized religion.137 It is based on the belief that France
should ignore religious and ethnic differences, and instead promote a
unified national identity.138 Thus, the Court looks to this portion of
France’s national identity in introducing the concept of “living
together” and in light of this, concluded it was a legitimate aim.139
While this justification is traditionally a French concept, the
Court, by introducing the notion of “living together,” may cause other
countries to appropriate a distinctly French concept as well. This
could have long-lasting effects on how bans are instituted and written
in other countries. Furthermore, if a country is able to conform its
ban to the concept of “living together,” the ban may be upheld, which
would have been highly improbable under the Court’s pre-S.A.S.
jurisprudence. Through the S.A.S. decision, the Court has declared
that face-covering bans, regardless of whether they fly in the face of
international human rights instruments guaranteeing citizens
freedoms of religion and expression, can be justified simply because
they conceal the face and making discussions apparently more
difficult.
The Court is also not accomplishing the goal of making it easier
for ethnically and religiously diverse individuals to “live together.” By
making socializing more comfortable for one side, the Court’s ruling
may make the other individual, the one who wishes to wear a facecovering, more uncomfortable. For example, in Belkacemi, the
applicant refused to go out in public without her face veil, and instead
stays at home.140 It would be extremely difficult for the Court to make

136. Elizabeth Winkler, Is it Time for France to Abandon Laïcité?, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 7, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/
127179/time-france-abandon-laicite [https://perma.cc/U2DZ-VJ8P].
137. See id. (discussing France’s strict secularism).
138. Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The
Unwarranted Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the
European Court of Human Rights, 22 INDIANA INT’L. AND COMP. LAW
REV. 93, 98-99 (April 1, 2012).
139. See Bernard Keenan, S.A.S. v. France- the French principle of “living
together” and the limits of individual human rights, THE LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (July 14, 2014)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2014/07/14/s-a-s-v-france/
[https://perma.cc/JEG6-WXPV] (noting that “vivre ensemble” is a
legitimate aim).
140. See Brems, supra note 113 (noting the effect of the face veil ban on the
applicants in Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium).
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an impartial choice on who should have to endure their
uncomfortableness.
Courts, while not formally bound to follow previous judgments,
“in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before
the law” that the Court should follow precedents laid down in
previously decided cases.141 Most likely, the Court will not overrule
such a recent decision, regardless of how controversial that decision
was.
The ultimate deciding factor of whether “living together” will
make on impact on future European Court of Human Rights cases is
the justification employed by the government in defense of their facecovering ban. In this vein, if the government decides to go with a
previously rejected justification – public safety or gender equality the ban will most likely be overturned. However, a truly well-formed
argument invoking the notion of “living together,” may succeed in
light of S.A.S.

VII. “LIVING TOGETHER” – A TROUBLESOME
FUTURE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
The ECtHR’s intention behind “living together” could have
certainly started out as a good faith attempt to strike a balance
between widely-held public interests and individual religious freedoms
in order to bring about broader societal harmony in Europe. Most of
the bans are neutral provisions; they do not mention a specific
religion.142 In an attempt to balance the aforementioned interests, the
S.A.S. majority noted that France was seeking to protect “a principle
of interaction between individuals” which the state views as “essential
for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is not democratic society.”143
The ban attempts to make living in a modern, multi-ethnic state
more comfortable by taking away the “barrier” a burqa or niqab
presents and to facilitate open communication. Proponents argued
that the ban would “release women from the subservience of the fullface veil” allowing them to belong to society.144 Some view the burqa

141. Weller, supra note 109 at 139.
142. Shaira Nanwani, The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on
Religious Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction [comments], 25 EMORY
INTL. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2011) (explaining the French burqa ban and
its background).
143. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at ¶ 153.
144. Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S v. France: Supporting ‘Living Together’ or Forced
Assimilation, 3 INTL. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 277, 283 (2014).
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and niqab as “a tomb” for the women who wear it.145 Thus, by
banning the burqa, supporters allege they are getting rid of the
oppressive garment, which some Muslim women do not have a choice
whether to wear.146 However, this view completely disregards those
women, such as S.A.S. who independently choose to wear the burqa,
with no external force.147
The Court’s good-faith effort, however, does not ease the
integration of Muslims into French society, but rather forces Muslims
to assimilate to European culture. The Court’s ruling, which
essentially states that those who wear religious coverings cannot “live
together” with those of a different nationality is an absurd and
potentially dangerous conclusion. Instead of protecting the individual
freedoms enshrined in various human rights instruments, the Court
instituted a new concept with no legal or moral justification. Instead
of fostering immigration and community, the Court has chosen to
force a minority to surrender to the preferences of the majority.
Assimilation is a concept typically frowned upon. Assimilation
reduces the diversity of cultures.148 Cultures are similar to works of
art; similarly the loss of a culture can be a tragedy for the world as a
whole, just as a lost work of art is mourned.149 Minority protections
such as the Human Rights Committee’s Rights of Minorities exist to
protect the survival of minority cultures.150 However, this ruling by
the ECtHR undermines all of the protections groups such as the
Human Rights Committee worked toward. By solidifying the idea of
“living together” as a real, substantial argument, the court infringes
these protections, and instead values cultural neutrality over personal
religious expression.
145. William Langley, France’s burka ban is a victory for tolerance, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/france/8444177/BurkaFranceNational-FrontMarineLe-PenMuslimFadela-AmaraAndre-Gerinhijab.html
[https://perma.cc/QGK8-FTCE].
146. See id. (“Large numbers of the women who wear the burka – whether in
France, Britain or anywhere else – don’t have a choice.”).
147. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 11.
148. See Michael Blake, Diversity, Survival, and Assimilation, 12 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 637, 650 (2001-2002) (“The price of acting to
preserve a diversity of cultures, it seems, is that diversity within culture
may thereby be withered.”).
149. See generally id. at 642 (explaining the problems with assimilation).
150. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article
27 (Rights of Minorities), at 1, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General
Comment No. 23 (April 8, 1994) http://www.refworld.org/
docid/453883fc0.html [https://perma.cc/5N5A-5893] (explaining that
the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s establishes rights to minorities
including the right to enjoy their own culture and to use their own
language, among rights).
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This is not to say that freedoms should always take precedence.
There are certain circumstances where freedoms can be infringed for
overwhelming interests, such as an actual, realized national security
threat. The Court had arrived at this conclusion and used a type of
balancing test prior to the S.A.S. ruling. In situations where the ban
was narrowed and specific, like ensuring public safety in airports and
Consulates, such as in Phull and El Morsli, often the state’s
justification would overrule and override religious freedoms. However,
when the ban was too broad, and the state could not limit it to a
specific justification, such as in Ahmet Arslan, religious freedoms
would win out. The ruling in S.A.S. destroyed any balancing system
the Court had implemented prior. Instead, the Court threw out all of
the precedential rulings it had set in place beforehand in favor of
introducing and justifying “living together.” In the S.A.S. ruling, the
ECtHR even stated that a total ban in all public places was
disproportionate in order to fulfill the public safety ground; however,
the concept of living together still justified the total ban as
proportionate.151
Therefore, instead of implementing a proportionate, fair balancing
system which weighs the rights of both the individual and state, the
Court introduced the catch-all “living together” which is heavily in
favor of the state. A fair balancing test cannot be done with the
concept of “living together” as the concept is so amorphous. Now,
instead of community rights only trumping in some cases, and not
others, with a well-phrased justification warranting an inclusive
society, or preventing an interruption of communication, individual
religious rights will continuously be impeded and obstructed by the
Court.
However, with its recent rulings, the Court does not seem keen to
take this approach, but has instead extended its reach of “living
together.” The case Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland involved
the refusal of Muslim parents to send their daughters to send their
daughters to their enrolled school’s mandatory mixed-sex swimming
lessons.152 The school refused to grant the daughters an exception, and
a case was brought by the parents of the two Muslim girls153 The
ECtHR, while not specifically citing “living together”, again expressed
this idea of assimilation over personal freedoms. The Court
151. See Marshall, supra note 91 at 381-382 (“While a total ban was then
analysed as disproportionate on the public safety ground, the majority
concluded that the concept of living together justified a total ban as
being proportionate and therefore ‘necessary in a democratic society’.”).
152. Press Release, Eur. Ct. H.R. Osmanoǧlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland
(Jan. 10, 2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-55921227062572 [https://perma.cc/2KQ9-EPFB].
153. Id.
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emphasized “that school played a special role in the process of social
integration.”154 Thus, the children’s “successful social integration”
took precedence over the “applicants’ private interest.”155
While other analyses of S.A.S. v. France have suggested that the
Court’s “living together” justification is unlikely to be used by the
Court in future cases,156 this latest ruling proves the opposite. Instead
of limiting the use of “living together,” the court has used an inclusive
society as justification in realms outside of religious garments. This
recent ruling should be worrisome; it shows that the Court will not
only continue to justify “living together,” but broaden it to other
areas than its initial use.
The broadness may also cross over to other religious garments in
other religions. Most of the uses and challenges which have appeared
before the ECtHR involve Muslims and the niqab or burqa. However,
there is nothing preventing this justification from being used against
other displays of religious symbols; in the past, the ECtHR has heard
cases on the visible display of cross necklaces.157 This was before the
S.A.S. ruling; however, post-S.A.S., as long as a country could
provide a vague “living together” justification, and a ban could be
implemented.
This is the extremely incorrect route for the Court to head. For
fairness purposes, and to prevent one interest from superseding
another, the Court needs to reintroduce a balancing test, as well as
narrow down exactly what “living together” entails. Without
discussion and guidelines, this overly broad and vague term may
destroy all the work religious freedom activists have fought so hard to
procure. Without a return to a balancing test, the bar to a
justification that the Court will approve is substantially low, and
states will use that to their advantage again and again.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The concept of “living together” as a fairly new concept, but is
still significantly undeveloped. While the concept will play a huge role
in the actual decision of future Court decisions, the decision itself may
also allow a little insight into what the concept of “living together”
actually means.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally Weller, supra note 109, at 133-142 (citing France’s unique
culture and the European Court of Human Rights’ lack of stare decisis
as reasons why “living together” is unlikely to be used in future cases).
157. British Airways Christian Employee Nadia Eweida Wins Case, BBC
(Jan.
15,
2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21025332
[https://perma.cc/G636-PE5W].
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Another effect that remains to be seen is how the concept of
“living together” will affect international human rights law. As the
Court’s ruling in S.A.S. shows, while human rights are preached to be
nearly irrevocable rights, there are certain justifications and reasoning
which can outweigh these individual rights guaranteed. Whether
continued rulings on the path of S.A.S. will have lasting effects on the
protection of human rights in Europe will certainly be interesting to
see.
As the public opinion polls have shown, bans subjecting those
who wear articles of religious expression, particularly burqas and
niqabs may be on an increase.158 With an increased number of bans, it
surely follows that an increased number of complaints will occur as
well. This is an issue that could have profound consequences on the
freedom of religious expressions, certainly in Europe. Most likely an
issue like this may also extend outside of the range of burqas and
niqabs, but affect other religions as well. If the Court does not make a
stand, and narrow its definition of “living together,” many European
citizens may have to learn how to live apart from their freedom of
expression.

158. See generally Stone, supra note 44 (“Research… found a huge proportion
of the public had no qualms about telling women what to wear, with 57
per cent in favour of a ban and just 25 per cent against.”); see also
Lowe, supra note 45 (“The poll… found that 81 percent of Germans
backed a full or partial ban on the burqa, a full-cover religious garment
worn by some Muslim women.”).
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